We consider traffic networks with a common origin and common destination that are subject to congestion and susceptible to the Braess Paradox. Users of such networks choose their routes simultaneously in an attempt to minimize travel cost. A counterintuitive implication of the equilibrium analysis of the users' route choices is that as demand for the network increases the addition of a new edge to the network may be beneficial to all the users when the network congestion is relatively low (n = 10 in our study), harmful when congestion is moderate (n = 20), and have no effect when congestion is high (n = 40). Using a within-subject design with payoff contingent on performance, we test this hypothesis in network experiment and report evidence that strongly supports it.
Introduction
Networks form the infrastructure for the functioning of modern societies, particularly in the domains of transportation and communication. Trains move on railways, cars travel on highways, and electronic messages are transmitted through telecommunication lines. The design, control, maintenance, and upgrading of such networks require considerable knowledge of fundamental issues in science and engineering. But since networks are designed for and used by human agents, whose rationality is known to be bounded and their cognitive abilities are limited (see, e.g., the voluminous literature on heuristics and biases), equally important for the successful functioning of such networks is the understanding of the behavioral patterns that emerge when groups of independent agents have to use these networks repeatedly (see, e.g., Schelling, 1978) .
A major question concerns the effects of changes in the network: if the topology of the network or the demand for the network are changed, do users adjust to these changes and if so, can the dynamics of their behavior be accounted for? Answers to this question are important not only to engineers, policy makers, and network managers, but also to social scientists interested in the more general question of how decentralized decision making systems behave in a nonstationary environment as the network users have to adjust to changes in order to achieve whatever goals they have in mind.
We tackle this question experimentally by systematically manipulating changes in demand for network service in the controlled environment of the laboratory. We propose to simulate a simple traffic network in the laboratory and display it on networked computers, recruit subjects who volunteer to participate in a route choice experiment for payoff contingent on performance, repeat the stage game with large groups of subjects for multiple periods to study the effects of outcome information and experience on route choice, systematically change the demand for the network, and study how subjects respond to these changes. We use the Nash equilibrium solution concept as the theoretical benchmark for modeling route choice by the users. Previous experimental studies by Gisches (2005a, 2005b, hereafter RKDG) have investigated user reaction to changes in the topology of the network. Without changing the network topology, the present study focuses on user reaction to changes in the demand imposed on the same network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 consists of five sub-sections. The first introduces terminology required to model traffic networks as directed graphs. The second continues with a description and discussion of the network that we implement in the present study. This particular network is susceptible to the Braess Paradox (Braess, 1968, hereafter BP) that we describe below in detail. Section 2 continues with two sub-sections that review the theoretical and experimental literature, respectively, and concludes with a fifth sub-section that presents the major hypotheses of the study. Section 3 first describes the experimental design and then the results of the experiment. The results provide strong support for the equilibrium solution and the counter-intuitive behavior that it implies for variable demand. Section 4 concludes.
Theory

Terminology
We focus on networks that are modeled by a graph G = (V, E, O, D) , where V is a finite set of vertices (nodes), E is a finite set of edges (arcs, links), and O (the origin) and D (the destination) are two distinct vertices in V. Each edge e ∈ E has a tail t(e) ∈ V and a head h(e) ∈ V; we interpret e as a one-way road segment from t(e) to h(e). A route (path) in the network G is a sequence of the form v 0 , e 1 , v 1 , e 2 , v 2 ,…,v g-1 , e g , v g , where v 0 , v 1 , …, v g are distinct vertices, v 0 = O, v g = D, and e 1 , e 2 , …,e g are edges satisfying t(e i ) = v i-1 and h(e i ) = v i for i = 1, 2, …, g.
We consider noncooperative games with complete information that are played on the network G and have the following ingredients:
• A finite set of players (users) N = {1, 2, …, n}. Transportation science differentiates between the case where n is infinite, so that each user has an infinitely small impact on road congestion, and the case where n is finite. In our study n is finite and commonly known.
• An assignment of costs to edges that may depend on the number of users who traverse these edges. We denote by c ij (f ij ) the cost to each user of moving along an edge (i, j) with a tail t(e) = i and head h(e) = j, if the total number of users of (i, j) is f ij . In the context of traffic networks, c ij (f ij ) is taken to represent the travel cost for road segment (i, j) when it is traversed by f ij users.
• In our experimental games, every user has to travel from an origin O to a destination D. The strategy space of each user is the set of routes in G. Route choices are made simultaneously so that any explicit collusion between users is prohibited. We consider in this study traffic networks with affine cost functions, where for each edge (i, j) ∈ E, c ij (f ij ) = a ij f ij + b ij for some non-negative constants a ij and b ij . The affine cost function includes two components, a fixed component b ij that is interpreted as the cost of traversing edge (i, j) by a single user, and a variable component a ij that when positive accounts for the increase in travel cost due to congestion. We chose affine edge cost functions because they are intuitive and thus most easily explained to the subjects, and because they are supported by empirical evidence (Steinberg & Zangwill, 1983) .
The Braess Paradox
Exogenous changes in traffic networks often consist of adding new links or deleting existing links. It seems intuitively obvious that adding new links to a traffic network, and thereby increasing its capacity, should decrease or at least have no effect on the average cost of travel from vertex O to D. Braess showed that if the traffic network is susceptible to congestion then this conclusion may not be true (Braess, 1968 , Murchland, 1970 . In his seminal paper, Braess presented a very simple model of a congested traffic network with only four vertices and showed that, paradoxically, when a link is added to the network and each driver independently seeks her best possible route from the origin O to the destination D, at the new equilibrium the cost of travel of all drivers may increase. Arnott and Small (1994) , Cohen and Jeffries (1997) , and Vickrey (1969) have discussed other adverse effects of congestion in traffic networks. The BP has attracted considerable attention and instigated much theoretical research in transportation science, engineering, and computer science (Roughgarden, 2005) .
To illustrate the BP, consider a finite number n of drivers seeking to travel by car from an Braess, 1968) . Moreover, the BP can be realized for any n > 2. Consider, e.g., a 4-node network with n = 2, c OA ( There is a flip side to the BP that some may find even more intriguing. In the BP just described above (n = 20), the addition of a link to a network causes all users to be worse off in equilibrium. Alternatively, start with the augmented network in Fig. 1B , delete the edge (A-B) and note that, in equilibrium, all 20 users benefit from the degradation of the network.
The latter example with n = 20 users is just another illustration that the Nash equilibrium does not, in general, maximize social welfare. Two other well-known examples that dramatically illustrate the Pareto inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium are the n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game (see, e.g., Colman, 1995; Schelling, 1978) and the Centipede game (Aumann, 1992) . As noted by RKDG (2005b), the finitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game, Centipede game, and network games susceptible to the BP provide complementary perspectives for examining interactive decision situations in which Nash equilibria do not maximize social welfare. They are complementary in the sense that the Prisoner's Dilemma is a strategic form game with dominated strategies, the Centipede game is an extensive form game with payoffs that vary from one terminal node to another, and the BP is realized for certain parameter values when comparing to each other two networks that only differ from each other by the addition of one or more links. It is the surprising implications of the equilibrium analysis of these games that deepen our understanding of the equilibrium solution, clarify the conflict between individual and group rationality, illustrate the effects of negative externalities (see Schelling, 1960 , on the effects of negative externalities in other contexts), and thereby induce our intuition about decentralized decision making to expand.
Previous Theoretical Research.
Following the discovery of the BP by Braess, researchers have attempted to classify traffic networks in which the addition of a single link could degrade network performance (Frank, 1981; Steinberg & Zangwill, 1983) . Dafermos and Nagurney (1984) , Smith (1979) , and Steinberg and Stone (1988) have discovered new types of "paradoxes," and Roughgarden (2002) has proved that detecting the BP even in its worst possible manifestation is algorithmically difficult. Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) proved that in traffic networks in which the cost associated with each edge is an affine function of this edge congestion, the flow at the Nash equilibrium has total cost of at most 4/3 times that of the optimal flow. For further extensions, discussions, and examples of the BP and related problems in route choice, see Catoni and Pallottino (1991) , Fisk (1979) , Penchina (1997) , Roughgarden (2005) , and Pas and Principio (1997) .
2.4._Previous Experimental Research
There are only a few experimental studies of route selection in congested traffic networks. Selten et al. (2004) conducted laboratory experiments of a day-by-day route choice game with two parallel roads but no crossroad very similar to Fig. 1A in our study. They reported aggregate road choices that were accounted for quite well by the Nash equilibrium predictions and large fluctuations around the mean choice frequencies, which did not seem to diminish after a large number of trials. Helbing (2004) reported experiments with more iterations, and further tested additional experimental conditions in an attempt to better understand the reasons for the fairly large fluctuations around the mean choice frequencies. Iida, Akiyama, and Uchida (1992) conducted similar experiments in Japan with traffic conditions that vary from one day to another.
They reported that traffic flow did not converge to equilibrium. All of these experiments have held the network fixed over multiple iterations. None of them has been concerned with changes in behavior due to changes in the topology of the network or in the number of users.
Two other studies of the BP by RKDG (2005a RKDG ( , 2005b are more directly relevant to our study. We only report here the results of Experiment 1 in RKDG (2005a), which used the same networks in Figs. 1A and 1B with link cost function parameters c OA (
, and c AB (f AB ) = 0. Six groups of n = 18 subjects each participated in the experiment. Three groups first played Game 1A (Fig. 1A ) for 40 identical rounds and then Game 1B (Fig. 1B) for 40 additional rounds (Condition ADD), whereas three other groups played the two games in the reverse order (Condition DELETE). The network and edge costs were displayed on the individual computer screens on each round. After all players independently registered their route choices, each was informed of the number of players choosing each route and her payoff for the trial. Travel costs were subtracted on each period from a fixed endowment that assumed the same value for Games 1A and 1B. The major findings of Experiment 1 are as follows:
• There were no statistical differences between mean route choices in Conditions ADD and DELETE.
• The equilibrium solutions accounted very well for the mean route choices in Game 1A, and the mixed-strategy equilibrium accounted for the variability around the means. In agreement with results reported by Selten et al. (2004) and Helbing (2004) , fluctuations of the route frequencies around the mean in Game 1A persisted over all the 40 rounds. However, there was no support for mixed-strategy equilibrium play on the individual level, as most players mixed their route choices but not in the proportions implied by the symmetric equilibrium play.
• On each round, travel costs were subtracted from a fixed endowment of 420 to determine the subject's payoff. Consequently, equilibrium play reduced the payoff per round by 50% from 120
(420 -300) in Game 1A to 60 (420 -360) in Game 1B. Despite this sharp drop in payoff, mean route choices in Game 1B (and the corresponding individual payoffs) in both conditions slowly converged over iterations to the equilibrium strategies. By round 40, all the players in Game 1B in each of the six sessions chose the (deficient) equilibrium route (O-A-B-D).
2.5._Hypotheses
We examine in this section the effects of change in demand on equilibrium play in Game 1B
and characterize the equilibrium solutions. We first characterize the pure-strategy equilibria. If n is odd, it is no longer the case that all the n agents incur the same cost in equilibrium.
However, the mean travel cost falls between the costs associated with the adjacent even values of n. For example, if n = 11, then the mean travel cost is 264.45 (260 < 264.45 < 270).
--Insert Table 1 3 The three probabilities p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 , and the expected value EV, are solved from the four equations (Schelling, 1960) to help agents solving the coordination problem.
The right-hand column of Table 1 shows the effect of adding edge (A-B) to the network in Fig. 1A on the equilibrium travel cost. Table 1 can be divided into four regions:
• If 2 < n < 14, then all the n agents choose route (O-A-B-D) in Game 1B. The addition of the edge (A-B) is beneficial (or not harmful when n = 14).
• If 15 < n < 21, then all the n agents choose route (O-A-B-D) in Game 1B. The addition of the edge (A-B) is harmful.
• • If 41 < n, then route (O-A-B-D) is abandoned. The addition of edge (A-B) has no effect on the equilibrium travel cost.
Using a within-subject design, the experiment reported in Section 3 below tests these predictions for three selected values of n, namely, n=10, 20, and 40.
Experiment Method
Technology, who volunteered to participate in a decision making experiment for payoff contingent on performance. The subjects participated in one of two conditions each including three sessions. Each session lasted about two hours. The mean payoff was HK$145.
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Procedure. All the six sessions were conducted at a large computerized laboratory with 80 terminals. Upon arrival at the laboratory, the subjects were seated with maximum separation between them and handed written instructions. Questions about the procedure and the network game were answered privately by one of the experimenters.
The instructions 5 displayed the traffic network in Game 1B, explained the affine cost functions, and illustrated the computation of the travel costs for links with either fixed or variable costs. They also explained the computation of the payoff after subtracting the travel cost from a fixed endowment. The subjects played Game 1B in either 4 groups of n = 10 subjects each, 2 groups of n = 20 each, or a single group of n = 40 subjects. We'll refer to these as game types (or briefly Games) 1B-10, 1B-20, and 1B-40, respectively. Each of these three game types was iterated 40 times in a fixed-matching design for a total of 120 plays. In Condition I (for "increase"), the three game types were played in the order 1B-10, 1B-20, and 1B-40. In Condition D (for "decrease"), the three game types were played in the reverse order. Because subjects participated in the experiment under a within-subjects design, this design allows testing for the users' reaction to either increasing or decreasing demand on the same network.
The payoff for each round was computed separately for each subject by subtracting her travel cost from an endowment, E(n), that assumed the same value for all subjects and all rounds for a given n. There were three different endowments, namely, E(10) = 290, E(20) = 490, and E(40) = 500, resulting in the same equilibrium payoff of 290 -200 = 90, 490 -400 = 90, and 500 -410 = 90 per trial in Games 1B-10, 1B-20, and 1B-40, respectively.
To choose one of the routes in Game 1B, the subject had to click with the mouse on the links of this route and then press a "confirm" button. Route choices were self-paced. After all the n group members independently and anonymously registered and subsequently verified their route choices, a new screen was displayed with outcome information about choices and outcomes. The game was played under complete information that included the route chosen by the subject, the number of subjects choosing each of the three routes, and the subject's own payoff.
After completing the final trial, the subjects were paid their earnings in 4 randomly chosen trials for each of the three game types 1B-10, 1B-20, and 1B-40. Points were accumulated across the 12 payoff trials and then converted into money according to a commonly known conversion rate. Subjects were paid their earnings individually and dismissed from the laboratory.
Results
To assess the degree of support for equilibrium play in each game type, the effects of nonequilibrium play have to be considered. In equilibrium, all the players in Games 1B-10 and 1B- There is a consensus that, unless the noncooperative game is perceived to be trivial, equilibrium play is not reached by introspection. Rather, it is learned with experience. Our analysis above of non-equilibrium play suggests that equilibrium in Game 1B-10 will be reached quickly. The results reported by RKDG (2005a) suggest that equilibrium play in Game 1B-20, which is susceptible to the BP, will be reached rather slowly. RKDG reported that with n = 18 convergence to equilibrium in Game 1B-18 required 40 trials. Our analysis further suggests that equilibrium in Game 1B-40 will not be reached. Rather, on average, the players will divide Figure 2A displays the mean number of choices of the three routes for all 40 trials across the 24 groups.
choose route (O-A-B-D). Travel costs in
As predicted, convergence to equilibrium was reached in 5-7 trials. Out of 240 subjects, 213 chose the equilibrium route on all 40 trials. Only 27 subjects deviated by choosing either of the two non-equilibrium routes between 1 and 5 times.
--Insert . Therefore, we cannot attribute the results to an inertia effect.
Comparison with the results of Experiment 1 of RKDG (2005a) shows that subjects in the present study reached equilibrium twice as quickly. A possible reason for the faster rate of convergence might be due to the difference between the two experimental designs. Whereas subjects in the RKDG study played Game 1B-18 with and without the added link (A-B) , subjects in the present study only played the three-route Game 1B-20.
Route Choice: n = 40. Altogether, there were 6 groups of 40 subjects each who participated in Denote this cost as C (R, t) . Then, a route choice in trial t + 1 is defined to be:
A contrarian switch if R(t + 1) ≠ R(t) and C(R(t + 1), t) > C(R(t), t).
Any route choice in trial t + 1 that does not fall into any of the above categories is classified under the response category of "other". In addition, for each direct or contrarian switch in trial t + 1, its "response strength" is defined to be |C(
For each subject, we counted the total number of each category as well as the mean response strengths for the direct and contrarian types of switches, respectively. 6 Table 2 lists the major statistics of these dependent variables. The results indicate that the subjects did not switch for more than 55 percent of the time. If they ever made a switch, it was a direct switch for about 55 percent of the time and a contrarian switch for about 36 percent of the time. A paired t-test shows that the mean direct response strength is significantly larger than the mean contrarian response strength, t(228) = 5.21, p < 0.0001. An interpretation of this finding is that subjects are willing to use the more "adventurous" contrarian switch only when the cost difference is not "too large", while subjects are more easily lured to a direct switch when the cost difference is attractive.
--Insert Table 2 about here--
The correlations between the number of direct and contrarian switches (r= -0.065) and between the response strengths (r = 0.11) were not significant. Even more interestingly, there are negative and significant correlations (r = -0.23, -0.15) between direct/contrarian response strength and the frequency of the opposite type of switch, while the same type response strengthswitch frequency correlations (r = -0.064, -0.08) are non-significant. These results suggest that:
1. If a subject prefers direct switches, she will only use a contrarian switch when the cost difference associated with that contrarian switch is small; 2. If a subject prefers contrarian switches, she will only use a direct switch when the cost difference associated with that direct switch is small; 3. Subjects exhibit a wide variety of preference over direct and contrarian switches; preference of one type of switch does not predict preference of the other type;
4. A subject's preference over either direct or contrarian switch does not predict whether a large or low cost difference will induce her to use that type of switch.
Conclusions
If users of networks that share a common origin and common destination choose their routes simultaneously in a selfish attempt to minimize individual travel cost, then their behavior may give rise in equilibrium to counterintuitive results. One of them is due to Braess, who has shown that if a new edge is added to a simple 4-edge network, while keeping the number of users fixed, travel cost of all users may increase in equilibrium. RKDG (2005a RKDG ( , 2005b have reported evidence from three experiments with different costs or topologies in strong support of this implication. Pas and Principio (1997) have further demonstrated theoretically that if the topology of the network is held fixed, equilibrium travel cost associated with adding a new edge to the network may first decrease, then increase, and finally stay the same as the number of users progressively increases. The results of the present study support this counterintuitive implication.
The effects of increase in demand for the network on travel costs, which only holds for selected cost parameters, is particularly ironic as traffic networks are often expanded in reaction to or anticipation of increase in demand.
Viewed from a wider perspective, our results add support to the claim that as the number of interacting agents grows, the negative consequences of deficient Nash equilibria may be hard to avoid. Altruism, reciprocity, punishment, and tacit coordination that are quite effective in sustaining cooperation in some non-cooperative games with deficient equilibria when n = 2 quickly lose their effectiveness and potency when n increases. Differences in group size may account in part for the conflicting results reported in the literature about the predictive power of the Nash equilibrium solution. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- No. of choice of OABD No. of subjects 
